The evolution of Windows

What was needed was a version of Windows that matched the new hardware available, so that Microsoft’s applications could be ported to the PC.

That had to wait until 1987, when the PC market had moved on again. Crucially Aldus had converted its Pagemaker desktop publishing package from the Macintosh to the PC and shipped it with a run-time version of Windows, finally giving customers a reason to use the new environment.

The PC cloners had lowered the cost of PC/AT compatibles with faster processors, better graphics cards, and scope for additional memory above 1MB. And at the end of the year, Microsoft shipped Windows 2.0, with support for Intel’s 80286 and 80386 processors.

Second wind
The new package looked much more Macintosh-like. It reintroduced overlapping windows and the recycle bin, and used icons to represent programs and files rather than the MS-Dos Executive’s list displays. It also supported expanded memory and one version was shipped as a run-time environment for the new PC version of Excel.

The most significant new release, though, was Windows/386. Launched at the same time as Windows 2.0 and Excel, it used the superior memory management of the 80386 processor, and allowed multiple MS-Dos and Windows programs to run simultaneously in protected areas of Ram. This meant that one program crashing could not affect others or bring down the whole system, as had been all too likely before.

Other software developers started to write for the Windows 2.0 environment; packages like Corel Draw, Samna’s Ami word processor and Micrografx Designer were started for the PC and released in the next couple of years.

But at this point in Windows’ history there was a big diversion. In April 1987 IBM had launched the PS/2 line of computers in an attempt to take back the PC market from the cloners. It featured a new type of expansion slot, called the Micro Channel Architecture (MCA), which was incompatible with existing expansion cards and could only be used by other companies if they first licensed it from IBM.

On top of that, IBM decided it needed a new operating system that would eventually replace MS-Dos. OS/2 would be developed with Microsoft and would feature a new graphical user environment called Presentation Manager, which would be different from – and incompatible with – Windows.

IBM’s plan was that the PC clone makers would have to license its technology, and that OS/2 and Presentation Manager would take over from MS-Dos and Windows in due course, re-establishing the company’s control over PC development.

In particular, it believed that the clone makers would not dare to produce systems based on the 80386 without following the PS/2 standard; if they did, it would lead to multiple incompatible 32-bit expansion slot standards.

But IBM’s plan didn’t work. Compaq had pre-empted the PS/2 launch with the Deskpro/386 in late 1986, a machine that cleverly combined the 32-bit 80386 processor with standard 16-bit AT expansion slots that would take existing cards. It was this Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) design that the clone makers adopted. The PS/2 was a big failure outside IBM’s usual corporate clients.

Microsoft now had a problem on its hands. It had a version of Windows that would run well on the new generation of ISA-based machines and compelling applications to go with it; but it also had a contract with IBM to develop a competitor for its own operating system and to produce OS/2 versions of all its software.

The conflict lasted until 1989, by which time OS/2 1.1 with Presentation Manager was shipping, without much support from customers or third-party application developers. The final blow came when Microsoft launched its first PC version of Word for Windows – IBM claimed that Microsoft had promised to ship the OS/2 version first, so the contract was terminated and IBM continued OS/2 development alone. Microsoft could concentrate once again on improving Windows.